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Abstract
Information security management has become an increasingly serious and high-stake challenge
to organizations, due to growing reliance on the Internet as the business platform, the intrinsic
vulnerability of Internet technologies, and the increasing value of information stored in
information systems. Because of the complex nature and the large number of closely coupled
variables associated with information security problems, sophisticated analytical tools are
needed to help decision makers to address the management of information security with limited
resources. In this paper, we adopt the system dynamics approach to security analysis, with the
help of an information security life cycle model. By identifying the causal loop among such
variables as the attractiveness of information target and the total number of attacks, we develop a
system dynamics model for analyzing the effect of organizational security investments in the
attack stage of the information security life cycle. Using this model, we simulate a number of
security management scenarios and demonstrate the feasibility and validity of the system
dynamics approach. The model presented in this paper is adaptive, and its parameters and
relationships can be calibrated with empirical data for further refinement and customization for
specific situations in real world organizations.
Keywords: information security, system dynamics, simulation, security investment, security
management, security modelling.

1.

INTRODUCTION

Information security incidents have become routine occurrences in recent years. In the ten year
period from 1993 to 2003, the number of security incidents reported to CERT increased from
1,334 to 137,529 per year (CERT, 2006). Although most of the earlier attacks were largely for
bragging rights of the hackers with benign consequences, recent security attacks were often aimed
at stealing valuable information, such as customer credit card numbers and bank account
information, for monetary gains, identity theft, and other criminal intents. These attacks have
resulted in financial losses amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars to U.S. companies and
other organizations including government agencies (Gordon et al., 2004), and possibly in the
trillions worldwide (Mercuri, 2003; Cavusoglu et al., 2004).
In response to the increasingly frequent attacks and growing financial and legal risks associated
with security breaches, organizations are investing billions of dollars in information security-
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related products and services, in addition to the countless manpower and management attention
dedicated to protecting the data and systems and recovering from virus infections and occasional
breaches. According to a recent CSI/FBI survey, organizations spent between $141 and $643 per
employee annually on security-related operating expenses and capital expenditures, and about
half of the respondents reporting that one to five percent of their total IT budget is allocated to
information security, with some organizations as high as 10% (Gordon et al. 2005). Given the
high cost of information security and the fact that a “completely secure organization” is an
insurmountable, if not impossible, goal in today’s networked economy, a firm needs to determine
the most effective level of information security investment, based on the nature of the information
sets it intends to protect, the configurations of its information systems, the potential loss if a
security breach does occur, and the attack environment that it faces. Recent academic research in
the economics of information security, albeit limited, intends to address this issue (e.g., Gordon et
al., 2002; Cavusoglu et al. 2004, Huang et al, 2005, 2006).
In this study, we submit that the information security is a complex system of many closely and
circularly coupled variables, and seek to examine the issue of determining the most effective
ways of managing security investment based on the principles of system thinking and the
methodology of system dynamics (Sterman, 2000). What sets this approach apart from
traditional analytical methodologies is that it considers a large number of identified factors
pertaining to information security systemically and their interactions dynamically, instead of
assuming that the relationships are sequential (as in the case of game theory), deterministic (as in
financial analysis), or static (as in economic analysis), and often overly simplified (small number
of variables). In adopting this approach, we can model the real-world processes with dynamic
structure that simulates the realistic state of variables and their complex interactions. We believe
that the system dynamics approach is particularly salient to the study of information security in
organizational settings and can complement studies that are completely quantitative (e.g.,
economic and game theory analysis) or completely qualitative (socio-technical and organizational
analysis).
This paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2, we review the literature on information security
investment and point out the gaps that can be filled by a system dynamics approach. And we
discuss in detail the foundation of system dynamics, and propose an information security life
cycle model as the basis for system dynamics modeling. We then focus on the first stages of the
information security life cycle, namely the attack stage, and develop a system dynamics model to
examine the various types of investments the firm can make to reduce the number of attacks.
Simulation results of this model are presented in the second half of Section 3. Finally, in section
4, we discuss the results, limitations, and future direction of the system dynamics approach.

2.

RESEARCH BACKGROUND

2.1

Information Security Investment

When millions of dollars are spent each year by firms for information security related products
and services, a natural question top management would ask is: are we over or under spending on
information security? Research on the economics of information security investment attempts to
shed some lights on this question. Although an important topic academically and in practice, it is
still in its early stage. However, significant progress has been made in recent years along three
independent research streams. In the first stream, scholars aim to develop more practical
methodologies for analyzing the appropriate level of and return on information security
investment. These methods, including cost-benefit analysis (Gordon and Loeb, 2006), net
present value (NPV) and internal rate of return (IRR) (Gordon and Loeb, 2002b), risk
management (Hoo, 2000), bypass rate of security technologies (Arora et al., 2004), and analytic
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hierarchical process (AHP) (Bodin et al., 2005), focus on the financial or managerial evaluation
of security investments. The second stream is primarily based on classic economic analysis.
Scholars adopted utility maximization principle to derive optimal investment level of a firm under
a limited number of constraining conditions (Gordon and Loeb, 2002a; Huang et al., 2005, 2006).
However, both of these approaches treat information security as a static process with
deterministic outcomes, which is usually not the case in the real world. In the third research
stream, scholars use game theory to analyze the interactions between the attackers and defenders
of information security (Cavusoglu et al., 2004, 2006).
Although these streams of research have yielded some interesting and important results in the
evaluation and optimization of security investments, they all are based on the assumption that
equilibrium can be reached, among the few factors that they choose to analyze, in abstract
information security scenarios. In reality, however, information security is a complex system
with such variables as attacker intention, firm’s defense, recovery processes, security policies,
operating procedures, human behavioural factors, property and value of information sources, and
intrinsic vulnerability of systems, to name just a few. The relationships of these variables are
nonlinear, closely coupled, and often circular. And any change in one can have significant and
hard-to-predict impact on others. In addition, it is difficult, if not impossible, to identify the all
important dependent variable(s) that traditional analytic approaches aim to optimize. It is this
complex nature that motivates us to adopt a systemic approach, namely the system dynamics, for
examining the issues related to information system security and the impact of security
investments.
2.2

The System Dynamics Approach

The system dynamics techniques were developed in the 1950s by Forrester and his colleagues at
MIT, originally intended to model managerial and industrial processes based on control principles
(Forrester, 1961, 1968). The main focus of the system dynamics approach is to employ circular
causality and feedback structure to simulate observed behavior of complex systems. As a
discipline, system dynamics is grounded in the theory of nonlinear dynamics and control
developed in mathematics, physics, and engineering (Amaral and Ottino, 2004; Sterman, 2000).
Mathematically, the basic structure of a system dynamics model is a set of linear or non-linear,
coupled, first-order differentiation equations in the following form:

dx n
= f ( x n (t ), u (t )),
dt

(1)

xn (t ) = g ( x1n (t ),..., xnk (t )) ,

(2)

and

where xn(t) is a variable in the system structure, u(t) is the vector of exogenous input, xni(t), i =
1...k, are other variables in the system structure that are coupled with xn(t), and f( ) and g( ) are
two (likely nonlinear) functional forms. Note that with the circular feedback nature of system
dynamics, there is no clear delineation of dependent and independent variables in the set of
differential equations (1) and (2). That is, xn(t) is likely to be an argument of the expression (2)
for another variable, say, xm(t). Instead, variables can be either endogenous or exogenous to the
model’s structure, or controllable or uncontrollable from the firm’s perspective.
To adopt system dynamics approach to analyze managerial or organizational problems involves
three steps:
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•

Creating a model to represent the real-world structure. According to Forrester, system
dynamics models are formulated to unite “the structure of the real system, the behavior of
the real system, the model, the behavior of the model, and the model builder’s purpose”
(Forrester, 1979, p.15). Such dynamic structure serves as hypotheses that characterize the
interdependency, interaction, feedback, and causality of endogenous factors within the
systems being studied (Matinez-Moyano, 2003).

•

Establishing the functional relationships among the variables in the dynamic structure, as
represented by equation (2), and the “dynamics” of the variables, represented by equation
(1). These relationships can be analytical, empirical, or numerical in nature.

•

From a set of initial values, iterating (1) and (2) for all variables simultaneously to either
reach a steady state or for a set period of time. This is done often with the aid of computer
simulation programs.

The results of the computer simulation (Step 3) will give a dynamic picture of the behaviour of
the system under study. However, a rigorous and stable model (Step 1) and the variable
relationships therein (Step 2) are crucial to the usefulness of the system dynamics approach,
because “the most important and difficult step in system dynamics is perception of a model
structure appropriate to the chosen purpose” (Forrester, 1979, p. 14). Although “trial and error”
is often used to improve the modeling, techniques such as boundary scenarios and sensitivity
analysis can be employed to ensure the stability and robustness of the system dynamics models.
Other internal and external verification and validation methods are often necessary to make
certain the model’s functional integrity, structural integrity, completeness, and relevance.
Scholars in the information systems discipline have just started using the principles and
techniques of system dynamics in analyzing a variety of IT-related issues with complex structure
and relationships. King and Burgess (2006) examine the dynamics of ERP implementation
success by modeling the influences of critical success factors identified in prior research
literature, in the hope that better understanding of the implementation dynamics would lead to
better implementation strategies. In a similar fashion, Marqueza and Blanchar (2006) use a
system dynamics model to simulate the impact of investments in product design and marketing on
the revenue growth and profitability, taking into account factors such as consumer behavior and
competitors responses. They also demonstrate how such a simulation model can be used as a
decision support system for corporate planners to evaluate spending trade-offs in product
features, services, support, integration, channel incentive, pricing, and advertising.
In this paper, we submit that the system dynamics approach is particularly salient for the analysis
of information security. Previous research has used system dynamics to model areas of
information security such as insider threats (Anderson et al., 2004; Melara et al., 2003; Rich et al.,
2005), human factors in risk-dependent compliance (Gonzalez and Sawicka, 2002), and the
dynamic interaction of threats and counter-measures (Saunders, 2003). Our focus is on the effect
of information security investments and, with the help of the Information Security Life Cycle
model discussed below, how system dynamics models and their computer simulations help
determine the optimal allocation of such investments.
2.3

Information Security Life Cycle Model

Many studies of information security investments are based on a single-stage model, where the
security events take place in the transition of two states. For instance, the Gordon and Loeb
model (2002) assumes that a breach converts security attacks to losses, and the firm in question
invests to prevent such breaches from happening. This single-stage assumption simplifies
modeling efforts in general, but inevitably restricts a model’s ability to simulate real-world
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situation. In reality, firms have multiple levels of security defense in which to invest, and each
level has different impact on the ultimate outcome of security events.
In this study, we extend the multi-stage risk assessment methodology by Drake and Morse (1997)
and propose an Information Security Life Cycle (ISLC) model for the analysis of security
investment. In the ISLC model, a security event can traverse through four stages over time (see
Figure 1):

Figure 1. Information Security Life Cycle Model
•

Attack, issued by an adversary, reaches the firm’s information systems;

•

Breach happens when an attack compromises and penetrates the information systems;

•

Loss results from those security breaches that are not negated by the firm’s security
measures; and

•

Recovery happens when the loss is limited, and the firm returns to the first stage of
fielding attacks.

We believe that ISLC is well suited for using with the system dynamics approach for the
following reasons. First, each stage represents a well-defined sub-system that can be modeled
separately with a set of endogenous variables. In addition, the system dynamics models of the
adjacent stages can be linked through a limited set of variables, reducing the complexity of
modelling the whole system of information security. Lastly, investment classes identified in each
stage can be used as the basis for investment allocation within the models. In the next section, we
develop a system dynamics model for the first stage, the Attack stage, as a demonstration and also
validation of system dynamics approach to information security research.

3.

SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODEL

3.1

Model Development

Figure 2 shows our system dynamics model for the Attack stage in the ISLC, the result of a
combination of literature review and rounds of discussions among the co-authors. The core
structure (or the main causal loop) of the model is based on the dynamic interactions between the
actions of the attackers and the target firm, influencing and influenced by such factors as
perceived costs, perceived benefits, and perceived ease of attack (Cremonini and Nizovtsev,
2006; Jonsson and Olovsson, 1997; Leeson and Coyne, 2006; Liu, Zang, and Yu, 2005).
Typically, causal loops in system dynamics model come in two types: a reinforcing loop, where
the variables involved reinforce one another, and a balancing loop, where the variables interact
with one another in an oscillatory behavior. We argue that the main causal loop in the Attack
phase is largely one of reinforcement; that is, the successes of attacks lead to more attacks, and
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reduced attack frequency leads to still fewer attacks. Although such attack dynamics is plausible,
the implied result of zero or infinite number of attacks from this reinforcement is unrealistic.
Constraining such a reinforcing loop are firm’s investments in information security and the
effectiveness of such investments. The likely outcome of these constraints is a balancing behavior
among the firm’s managers and the attackers.
HR POLICY
INVESTMENT

TOTAL EMPLOY EE BASE
PROBABILITY OF ATTACK
~

HACKER TOOL AVAILABILITY

PERCEIVED VALUE OF TARGET

~

~

PERCENTAGE OF
INTERNAL ATTACKERS

ATTRACTIVENESS OF TARGET

~
NUMBER OF
INTERNAL ATTACKERS

VALUE REDUCTION
INVESTMENT
CHANGE IN ATTRACTIVENESS
OF TARGET

NUMBER OF
EXTERNAL ATTACKERS
TOTAL NUMBER
OF ATTACKS

INCREASED
ATTRACTIVENESS

IDENTIFIED VULNERABILITY
DETECTED ATTACKS

~

INTRUSION DETECTION
INVESTMENT

~

DECREASED
ATTRACTIVENESS

~
REDUCTION IN
IDENTIFIED VULNERABILITY

VULNERABILITY
REDUCTION INVESTMENT

DETERRENCE
~

DETERRENCE
INVESTMENT

LEGEND:
~
FLOWS

VARIABLES

RESERVOIR

CONTROLLABLE
VARIABLE

CONVERTERS

Figure 2. System Dynamics Model of the Attack Stage
As constraints to the reinforcing loop, information security investments seek to increase the costs
of attack, reduce the benefits of attack, and add to the difficulty of attack. In our model,
investments in this stage take several forms: human resources policy (to discourage internal
attackers), detection technologies, attack deterrence technologies and procedures, vulnerability
reduction, and information value reduction. The last category includes such actions as parsing
corporate data into small clusters, removing sensitive information from vulnerable servers, and
segmenting objects using neutral indexes, all aimed to reduce the value of information and
information systems to potential attackers. The other investment categories should be selfexplanatory. These investments are the controllable variables in the model; all other variables are
either directly or indirectly influenced by them. The uncontrollable variable that is of particular
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interest is the total number of attacks on the information system of the target firm, which is
expected to be reduced to the extent possible with the above investments.
The embedded logic of the model in Figure 2 is as follows. The total number of attacks
predicates on the total number of attackers—internal and external—and the availability of
hacking tools, which increases the productivity of attackers. The number of external attackers is
an exogenous, uncontrollable variable, while the number of internal attackers is represented as a
percentage of the total number of employees in the firm and can be reduced by the investments in
human resource policies that the firms undertakes to minimize the incentive for attacks from
within. The number of attacks is also a function of the probability that a potential attacker would
actually attack. This attack probability is a feedback variable from the reinforcing causal loop.
Attacks are known to the firm only when they are detected, and the extent of detection increases
with the investment in intrusion detection technologies. The detection of attacks has two effects.
As the number of detected attacks increases, the number of identified vulnerabilities also
increases (although not in a proportional manner, because a single vulnerability is likely to attract
multiple attacks). The more identified vulnerabilities there are, the more attractive the firm’s
information systems are to the attackers, and the more incentive for the firm to invest in reducing
the vulnerability. On the other hand, the need for deterrence increases with the number of
detected attacks, and the investment in deterrence would reduce the attractiveness of the target.
In summary, while the attractiveness of the target increases with identified vulnerabilities (the
reinforcement), it is diminished by investments that reduce vulnerability and increase deterrence
(the constraints).
The attractiveness of the information target is also influenced by the perceived value of the target,
which can be reduced with appropriate investments (e.g., not storing customer credit card
information on servers but relying on financial institutions to validate and processing credit
charges). The probability of attacks is a function of the attractiveness of the information target to
the attacker. The model closes and completes the causal loop by connecting the attack probability
as a functional argument of the total number of attacks.
3.2

Model Simulation

We use the iThink simulation software package as the tool for simulating the system dynamics
model in Figure 2. All of the relationships among the variables as described above were
operationalized as empirical functions. Except for the actual number of attacks and number of
employees and attackers, all other variables in the model are normalized between 0 and 1.
Simulation models need to undergo verification and validation before being used to generate any
useful results. Verification is conducted to ensure the logical structure and internal consistency of
the model. Validation ensures the applicability of the model and is usually done through
historical data when such data exists, boundary condition testing, or spot checking by managers.
At the current stage of this research, we perform preliminary verification and validation of the
model by examining the logical flow of the variable relationships, by sensitivity analysis, and by
boundary conditions testing.
In what follows we present the simulation results of a few scenarios. The purpose is both to test
the validity of the model and to demonstrate typical runs of such simulations.
3.2.1

Scenario A: Equal Investments.

In this base scenario, all investments in the Attack stage are equally weighted. That is, the
allocations for intrusion detection investment, HR policy investment, deterrence investment,
value reduction investment, and vulnerability reduction investment are all equal and set at 0.2 for
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a total of 1. The result of this simulation is shown in Figure 3. We can see that the total number
of attacks drops off exponentially as the impact of the investments is felt over time. This
demonstrates the effect of the investments as constraints to reinforcing loop of the attack
dynamics. It should be noted that, with the investments, the number of attacks does not drop to
zero. The asymptotic minimum (~ 4,000 in this case) can be regarded as the balance between
positive feedback of the reinforcing loop and the constraining effect of the investments. This
result is generally consistent with observed reality.

Figure 3.Scenario A: Equally Weighted Investments
3.2.2

Scenario B: Common Investment Practice.

We note that a commonly adopted security management practice is to invest only in intrusion
detection and in reducing the identified vulnerabilities. To simulate this common practice, we set
these two categories of investment are at 0.5 each, while setting others to 0. The simulation result
is presented in Figure 4. We note that, compare to Scenario A in Figure 3, the decay of the
number of attacks over time is slower, and the asymptotic minimum is higher. In other words,
investments in Scenario B are less effective in reducing the number of attackers than those in
Scenario A, and the common practice of security management appears to be inferior to the equalweight approach.

Figure 4.Scenario B: Detection and Vulnerability Reduction Investment
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3.2.3

Sensitivity Analysis

We test the stability of the model by applying sensitivity analysis to a select set of variables.
First, as shown in Figure 5, we vary the value reduction investment from 0.2 to 1.0 in steps of 0.2,
while setting all other investments at 0.2. As expected, the number of attacks drops with
increasing investment in this category. But it is important to note that the impact of the initial
increase in this investment is significant, while subsequent investment increases generate less and
less reduction in number of attacks. This behaviour points to the diminishing return on value
reduction investments, a reasonable behaviour of investment.

Figure 5. Sensitivity Analysis of Value Reduction Investment

Figure 6. Sensitivity Analysis of Vulnerability Reduction Investment
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When similar sensitivity analysis of step-wise increase is applied to vulnerability reduction
investments, only the rate of decrease in the number of attacks is affected; the asymptotic
minimum remains the same for all investment levels from 0.2 to 1. That is, as shown in Figure 6,
larger investment in this category tends to reduce the number of attacks quicker than smaller
investment, but to the same final level. This result seems consistent with practice, where, in the
long run, all attacks aim at exploiting those vulnerabilities that even large amount of investments
may not be able to fix easily.

Figure 7. Sensitivity Analysis of Intrusion Detection Investment
Lastly, we test the sensitivity to varying investments in intrusion detection, keeping all other
investment levels constant at 0.2. As shown in Figure 7, we find that as the detection investment
level increases, larger number of attacks persists initially before diminishing to the same level of
asymptotic minimum. This is because, with no additional action taken through other security
investments, greater number of attacks detected actually increases the attack probability, due to
the nature of the reinforcing loop. This result points to an important property of the information
system security, namely that higher level of detection alone does not lead to better security.
Based on the results of the sensitivity analysis, we conclude that the model in Figure 2 is stable
and congruent to real-world behavior of the information system security in the Attack stage.

4 CONCLUSIONS
As information systems are increasingly embedded into organizational and social processes,
information security cannot be considered as a pure technical challenge, nor does it have clear
boundaries between internal organizational processes and external environment. Many of today’s
security breaches in organizations occurred as results of the interactions between internal and
external, technical and social, process and behavioural factors that may or may not within the
control of the organizations. To better understand the complexity of information system security
and effectively manage and control the associated risks, it is helpful to use tools with the
capability of incorporating a large number of closely coupled variables and presenting a coherent
and logical structure of the interactions and consequences. In this paper, we attempt to address
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this need by using the system dynamics approach to the information security analysis. Based on
the Attack stage of the ISLC model, we demonstrate how system dynamics models can be
developed and utilized in evaluating and comparing investment options. Our preliminary results,
based on a few scenarios, show that the common security approach—concentrating security
investments in the highly visibly, technical areas such as intrusion detection and vulnerability
reduction—is less effective in reducing the number of attacks than a simplistic approach, where
investment dollars are equally divided among all the available security measures. And the
sensitivity analysis validates the stability and logical structure of our model.
It is important to note that our model presented in this study serves as a “proof of concept” for the
system dynamics approach in the field of information security. Although limited and
preliminary, this model already offers interesting practical implications. It is our intention to
further develop the model in the future. For example, models for the other three stages of the
ISLC need to be developed to provide a complete picture of information security. Another
important direction would be to calibrate the parameters and the relationships in the current
model with empirical data. And further study to validate the effectiveness of this system
dynamics against traditional methodologies in the management of information security
investment is also needed.
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